What are two major themes that were discussed as the U.S. foreign policy since the 1960s that led to 9/11?

How did key issues in the secrecy of decision-making affect policy?

What is the significance of World War II that Dale discusses?

Private wealth rather than public initiated what kinds of issues?

Who is Dale referring to that had the greatest impact?

Chapters 1-8

What, according to Power, is a recurrent theme of US failure to respond to acts of genocide over the years?

Why does Power also examine the response of US citizens to acts of genocide around the globe?

To what extent did Wilson’s self-determination policy support and challenge a sovereign state’s “right” to perpetrate acts of genocide?

Why was it critical to Lemkin to find a word to describe what was happening to Jews in Europe pre and during WWII?

What accounts for the shift in thinking in regards to holding nations and state leadership accountable for acts of genocide by the international community in December of 1948?

What statement(s) can be made about the American political system and the American people that it took nearly four decades for the US to ratify the 1948 Human Rights Treaty?

On page 69, Power states that US objection of the treaty “was rooted in a traditional hostility toward any infringement on US sovereignty.” Was this a valid concern in the 1950s? 1960s? 1970s?

What role did the media, specifically the New York Times, play in advancing Lemkin’s cause? In advancing the isolationists cause?

If the United States professes to support those peoples and nations who look to adopt democracy, what responsibility does the United States bare to those same nations and peoples who suffer such atrocities as ethnic cleansing and genocide?

How should the United States balance its interests (political, economic, social) with extreme human rights violations as seen in Cambodia, Iraq, and other nation states who initiate ethnic cleansing or genocide?

If other powerful nations (England, Germany, etc) fail to act other than to condemn such atrocities, should the United States?

Does America’s history in Vietnam justify the lack of a response to Pol Pot?

Given the fact that Americans were extremely distrustful of their own government, is it understandably that they then questioned whether or not the reporting on Cambodia was accurate?

According to McGovern, what was the difference between US involvement in Vietnam and the potential US involvement in Cambodia in the late 70s?

Given Carter’s post-presidential record on fighting against human rights violations, why did he refuse to involve the US in Cambodia?

To what extent is the UN and the International Court ineffective if nothing actually changes as a result of a UN declaration?

Why did the US finally ratify the genocide convention under Reagan?

What were US motivations in supporting Iraq during the war with Iran despite the ratification of the genocide convention?

Despite the information gathered by the State Department, why didn’t the US act?

If countries that ratified the genocide convention fail to respond in any measure to genocide, should they be held accountable?

How did Pell’s bill provide the Reagan administration an opportunity to act?

If the Reagan administration had the power to influence Iraq, why did they yet again choose not to despite more and more intelligence indicating the use of chemical weapons against the Kurds??

Are there any analogies to the Reagan and Bush (initially upon taking office) administrations appeasement of Hussein to that of Western Europe to Hitler during WWII?

1. Besides the air strikes initiated by the Clinton administration, and the involvement of the UN peacekeepers, what are some other actions the United States could have taken to hastily stop the escalation of genocide in Bosnia? What other forms of penalties, the US could have adapted to discontinue ethnic cleansing? Couldn’t the United States have initiated economic sanctions, request the dismissal of countries with genocidal regimes from the United Nations, close US embassies or even freeze foreign assets…?

2. Albert Einstein said “the world is a dangerous place to live in; not because of the people who are evil, but because of the people who don’t do anything about it.” Was Bush immoral for being so lackadaisical towards the ethnic cleansing occurring in Bosnia? What role does the newspaper and media play in promulgating an apathetic attitude towards various ethnic cleansing incidences?

3. Why was there such a lack of morality within the Bush and Clinton administration in regards to ethnic cleansing?

4. Why are protagonist who challenge and defend moral, and ethical principals of world politics, oftentimes branded as being senseless and illogical?

5. Does the Kosovo, and Rwanda genocide reflect an unfriendly, and selfish side to politics in which the right thing can only occur if it is in the best interest of the most prominently militarized nation?

6. Did humanitarian efforts in Somalia truly “deflect attention from Bosnia”?

7. Why did the U.S. focus on restoring a cease-fire and the Arusha agreement even after the Hutu government began eliminating the Tutsi?

8. In addition to the five convoys sent to evacuate two hundred and fifty Americans and other foreigners in Rwanda, why weren’t additional reinforcement of convoys sent to join the existing UN peacekeepers to be a deterrent force to the Hutus?

9. Weren’t the US and the UN aware that their threatening tactics to remove UN peace-keepers was what the Hutus wanted in order to carry out their vengeful acts?

10. Why were European governments so adamant about America not lifting the arms embargo, which would have ultimately help the Muslims defend themselves?

11. Similarly to Rwanda, UN was present when the genocide began in Srebrenica. Is America to be blamed for all the atrocities that occurred in the safe areas because they did not establish a military force of resistance to prevent the Serbs from furthering their brutality?

12. Why was a presidential threat from Senator Bob Dole, who supported actions in Bosnia, the only impetus, for the Clinton administration to finally begin armed intervention with NATO in 1995?

13. Why did the UN war crimes tribunal wait until May 24, 1999, to indict the then Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic; who had engineered two genocides during the years of 1995-1999?

14. What U.S. interests were being threatened, that provoked the United States to become involved in the Serb-Albanian conflict?

15. Does the punishment of perpetrators of genocide through the international court system help survivors cope with the atrocities they endured?

16. Why did it take added atrocities to occur in Yugoslavia and Rwanda in order for a war crimes tribunal to be formed?

17. Was Lemkin, and his successors influential in assisting to make genocide a crime?

18. Are there political interest, incentives and alliances , which influence the UN, and the tribunal court to pursue some criminals and not others?

19. Why did the United States prolong its refusal to ratify the genocide convention?

20. Why was the United States so reluctant to use the term genocide during the Bosnian, and Rwanda massacres?

21. Does the United States, the UN, and other countries have a moral responsibility to prevent and stop genocide throughout the world? Should the moral responsibility of multilateral involvement of countries take precedence over political interests?

1. What are the succession of events that led to American involvement in Cuba? What American interests were represented?

2. How did Castro’s personal inclinations about the USA shape Cuba’s foreign policy? Soviet commitment? African allegiance? From where did his feelings originate and what propelled them?

3. What was the link that caused Cuba to assist Algeria? How did they offer that assistance? What was their “parallel struggle”?

4. How does Glieijeses’ account of Cuban intervention in Zaire and the Congo change our perception of United States foreign policy? Is there any validity in suggesting that Cuba was involved in certain affairs to counteract US forces or was Cuba again representing countries in their “parallel struggle”?

5. What “new” history can be learned from the accounts of Angola?

6. In what ways does Gleijeses’ refute Kissinger’s assessment of the Angola situation [from the 70s]?

7. What does Gleijeses’ work teach us about the root causes for American intervention and America’s mission across the globe? Is this hidden tyranny?

8. In what ways does Gleijeses’ work restructure our perception of Fidel Castro? How is he depicted and how does that contrast or compliment our study of Cuba?

9. How does Gleijeses’ meticulous use of first-hand Cuban and American sources effect his understanding of Cuban-African relations?

2. What does Gaddis cite as the most dramatic shift in policy towards the Soviet Union after the deliverance of Kennan’s “long-telegraph”? Does Gaddis see this as an effective strategy by the U.S. in 1947?

3. How did Kennan differentiate the Soviet Union from Germany in terms of how each sought to expand their influences? What objectives did Kennan propose in order to handle the “Soviet challenge” of expansionism?

4. What reservations did Kennan have in the development of NATO and why did he feel that Western Europeans misunderstood the intentions of the Soviet Union?

5. What were some of the ways in which Kennan agreed and disagreed with what was outlined in NSC-68? Did Gaddis feel that NSC-68 was a success of failure in terms of U.S. diplomacy with the Soviet Union?

6. In Eisenhower’s final years in office, many intellectuals claimed that the “New Look” strategy had failed. What explanations did Gaddis offer for this?

7. What difficulties did the Eisenhower administration face while attempting to deal with Communism in the third world? Why did Gaddis claim that the administration suffered a “failure of vision” in terms of how they handled the threat of Communism?

8. What was John F. Kennedy’s “new” identity and what were some of the ways in which he differentiated himself from Eisenhower?

9. How was the “flexible response” strategy applied in Vietnam and what does Gaddis cite as its failures?

10. In 1968, Henry Kissinger claimed that American foreign policy needed to undergo a “philosophical deepening” to sufficiently create world order. What did he suggest in order to achieve this? How were his proclamations similar to those of George Kennan’s?

11. What were some of the ways in which Regan greatly differed from his predecessors in terms of how to deal with the Soviet Union? What were his complaints in regards to the strategy of détente?

12. Does Gladdis feel that the Cold War strategies of containment can be applied to modern-day U.S. diplomacy in the war on terror? Why or why not?

2. How does Robert’s treatment of the peace conferences (using Soviet records) differ from Trachtenberg’s (using American records)?

3. What were the major issues and compromises made during these conferences and were the resolutions as successful for the USSR as Stalin claimed in Roberts’ article? Were the compromises and decisions made at these conferences arbitrary or did they serve a particular purpose for the Big Three?

4. Explain the role of hegemony and Soviet influence in Poland and Yugoslavia.

5. What is the reason Perovic gives for the split between Tito and Stalin and how does it differ from the version previously held by many historians?

6. How was Yugoslavia the model for other Eastern European countries in regards to “Stalin’s Sovietization? How did Yugoslav socialism under Tito differ from the Soviet hierarchy?

7. Did Tito’s decision to sign a treaty with Bulgaria and send troops into troops into Albania affect Stalin’s negotiations with the US and Great Britain?

8. Truman said “I’ve gotten what I came for,” when Stalin stated he would be ready to attack Japan by the end of August 1945. What were the goals of the United States during the Big Three conferences? Were there any ‘double-standards’ from either the United States or the USSR in the spheres of influence in Germany, the Balkans, and Japan?

2) In the introduction, May references Marc Bloch’s Strange Defeat – What factors does he pull from this valuable & contemporary source? (there are four)

3) In what way does May’s approach take another, and arguably more complete, look at France’s defeat?

4) May implies that democracies can be inefficient when it comes to war. Why is this?

5) What was different about the way the allies conducted the their intelligence as compared to the Germans? Why is this crucial?

6) May makes the case that a Fascist regime, like that of the Nazi’s, is better suited for quick decision making in stressful situations than that of democracies, which have large bureaucracies and constituents to please. Do you agree?

7) In the chapters on French political leadership, namely Daladier and Gamelin, did indecision(Rhineland) and the desire to avoid war prove costly? Why or why not?

8) Again, in the chapter ‘cross currents’, we see another apparent disadvantage of the politicians of the Allied countries – the need to appeal to the masses, especially in election years. After reading May, and based on your own knowledge of history, can you see any other course of action for French politicians to pursue given the domestic and international climate? Could they have better promoted the need for action among the public?

9) Why did the French military leadership, namely Gamelin, choose to limit the availability of intelligence?
Why did he and Bonnet choose to not promote a sense of urgency when germany moved into the Rhineland and into Austria?

10) May provides many examples of past events and traditional attitudes that clearly affected, and at times, inhibited the ability of French leadership to make resolute decisions. Can you name some examples – (racism, attitude toward Soviets, The cavalry, Losses of WWI, international and domestic reactions, past French movement in Rhineland in 1920’s)

11) Is it realistic to think that French politicians could have reacted differently given the cool relations with Britain and the general domestic and international political climate?

12) According to May, how influential was the appointment of Bonnet, a non-supporter of intervention against Germany?